1. The defect in the administrative investigation affecting the municipal decision emerges insofar as the decision peremptorily excludes the existence of an area to be designated as a place of worship which, however, appears to exist according to urban planning documents. Moreover, by contradictorily requiring the Association to fulfill obligations that presuppose the existence of such an area, the decision nevertheless indicates that, even if the area were available, a public procurement procedure would still be necessary.
2. In so doing, however, the Municipality—despite its own statements in the decision claiming to comply with the Constitutional Court’s rulings on religious freedom—places an unlawful and insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of worship by the requesting Association (see, on this point, Constitutional Court, 5 December 2019, no. 254). The rejection, in its peremptory and unreasoned nature, prevents any further initiative or prospect of action by the Association, which, moreover, after gaining access to the documents and within the procedural exchange, had identified an area potentially assignable to worship purposes under the urban planning instruments.
