Introduction

 

This short contribution illustrates, from a religious perspective, some claims that may justify possible requests for the recognition of the right to conscientious objection to compulsory vaccination. This topic is not so often discussed in the current public debate on vaccination against Covid-19. Such requests can be based, instead, on sincere and cogent religious convictions.

For this reason, regardless of the position that the legislator may take on the matter - there are, in fact, persuasive arguments that militate in favor of excluding conscientious objection in the case of vaccinations - such requests would deserve not only the attention of the public opinion but also, above all, consideration by a legal order oriented towards pluralism, the respect for religious freedom and freedom of conscience.

 

Islam, Judaism and Jainism: between religious precepts, nutrition and vaccines

 

Several Eastern religions present, among their dictates, religious precepts in potential conflict with the use of vaccines, for the way in which they act or for components they are made up with. One of these religions is Jainism (1): it is an Eastern religion that prohibits the killing of any living creature, including bacteria and viruses. This precept represents one of the five vows that the Jain is required to observe: the Ahimsa(2), which is the duty not to harm any living creature.

The vaccine could be considered, in light of this precept, as an illicit practice, because it would cause the voluntary suppression of the virus. The problem, actually, seems only theoretical: the same Jain religion, for example, admits self-defense(3): in the case of vaccines, the intention to prevent a serious disease would legitimize, therefore, the killing of the virus. The case is interesting, even though it does not give rise to a claim of conscientious objection, because it provides evidence of how a religious precept can provoke a conflict of conscience regarding vaccinations.

As for Islam and Judaism, these two religions both provide dietary canons to which believers must abide by: consider, for Islam, the prohibition to eat pork. Through what he eats, the believer assures himself the salvation of his soul, but not only. Besides, "the religious alimentary norm becomes a powerful marker of cultural belonging"(4), therefore "[t]he right to eat according to the rules of one's faith is not only a source of mere physical sustenance, but above all a mental one"(5).

There is no doubt, therefore, that "the right to feed oneself according to the dictates of one's own faith constitutes an exercise of the right to religious freedom guaranteed by art. 19(6) of our Constitutional Charter, defined by the scholarship as "religious alimentary freedom"(7). The conflict of conscience derives, therefore, from the presence of "excipients originated from pork that are used in the preparation of some vaccines"(8). The duty to undergo vaccine prophylaxis thus comes into conflict with the religious freedom of those who belong to those religions that direct the food choices of their faithful to a ban on eating pork. This logic could also extend to the Jewish religion, according to which the faithful must follow strict dietary regimes and eat only kosher food.

In this context, the refusal to undergo vaccination could abstractly fall within a hypothesis of conscientious objection, since the refusal would be motivated by a religious precept. Actually, as well as for the Jain religion, the contrast is overcome internally within the religion itself: "Jewish scholars in this case value the prevailing intention to save life, both personal and that of others, as the fulfillment of a divine command"(9). Moreover, "the prohibition to ingest non-kosher food is not valid in the case of vaccines that are, as a rule, injected through the skin and, in any case, all medicines that serve to save life are lawful, even if they are not kosher"(10).

Islamic scholars have also expressed themselves in similar terms: a product that is originally impure can later become halal through the process of transformation. This is the principle of istihala, which is also applied to alcohol in medicines. After processing there is no longer any legal relationship between the pig and the finished product.

 

Conclusions

 

The debate on the admissibility of conscientious objection in the case of compulsory vaccination appears to be very complex, but it cannot be ignored in a country where there is an increasing presence of migratory phenomena and cultural exchanges. These factors impose that a legal system that is sensible to protecting pluralism in all its forms cannot be insensitive to the objections that arise within it. This contribution illustrates that, in some cases, the refusal of vaccinations may be supported by religious reasons. It is necessary, therefore, to evaluate the vaccination requirement also in light of possible objections and to operate a proper balance between all the rights and freedoms involved.

 

(by Veronica de Ponti, graduating in Ecclesiastical Law at University of Milano-Bicocca)

 

Notes

 

(1) M.L. Lo Giacco, Il rifiuto delle vaccinazioni obbligatorie per motivi di coscienza. Spunti di comparazione, in Stato e chiese e pluralismo confessionale, 2020, 42 ss.

 

(2) For a quick overview on Jainism, see Chiesa di Milano, Gianismo, online: https://www.chiesadimilano.it/cms/speciali-archivio/religioni-e-culture/giainismo-25515.html

 

(3) M.L. Lo Giacco, Il rifiuto delle vaccinazioni obbligatorie per motivi di coscienza. Spunti di comparazione, cit., 42 ss.

 

(4) E. Stradella, Ebraismo e cibo: un binomio antico e nuove tendenze alla prova del multiculturalismo, in Stato e chiese e pluralismo confessionale, 2019, 129 ss.

 

(5) A. Valletta, Il diritto al cibo religiosamente orientato al tempo di pandemia, in Stato e chiese e pluralismo confessionale, 2020, 110 ss.

 

(6) Italian Constitution, art. 19: "Everyone is entitled to freely profess religious beliefs in any form, individually or with others, to promote them, and to celebrate rites in public or in private, provided they are not offensive to public morality".

 

(7) A. Valletta, Il diritto al cibo religiosamente orientato al tempo di pandemia, cit., 110 ss.

 

(8) M.L. Lo Giacco, Il rifiuto delle vaccinazioni obbligatorie per motivi di coscienza. Spunti di comparazione, cit., 42 ss.

 

(9) Ibidem.

 

(10) Ibidem.