The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the case of Rafiyev v. Azerbaijan of July 8, 2025, establishes the violation of three fundamental articles of the Convention: Art. 5 § 1 (right to liberty and security), Art. 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial), and Art. 9 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion). The proceedings under examination concern the arrest and administrative sanction imposed on Vugar Karim oglu Rafiyev, a follower of the Islamic-rooted Nurist teachings, following his participation in a religious meeting held in a private dwelling without due authorization. The decision is significant as it reiterates the crucial importance of the principle of legality and religious pluralism in a democratic society. The Court, in fact, established that the interference with Rafiyev’s right to freedom of religion, due to his arrest and subsequent conviction for participating in a religious meeting, was not «prescribed by law». This commentary focuses on this aspect of the ruling.

As far as the violation of Art. 9 of the ECHR is concerned, the parties agree, and the Court takes note, of the existence of an interference with the applicant's freedom of religion, caused by his arrest and conviction for having taken part in a religious meeting. It remains, however, to be established whether such interference complies with the parameters of Art. 9, § 2, by verifying whether it was «prescribed by law», pursued a legitimate aim, and was «necessary in a democratic society» (§ 55). The Court emphasizes that the expression «prescribed by law» implies not only a formal statutory basis but also that the legislation is clear and accessible. Such clarity is essential to guarantee the predictability of consequences for the individual and to provide an effective safeguard against arbitrary action by public authorities, by explicitly defining the scope and manner of exercise of any discretion (§ 57). Consequently, it recognizes that neither the Azerbaijani Government nor the domestic courts referred to any provisions of domestic law (in particular Art. 515.0.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (the CAO) and Art. 12 of the 1992 Law on freedom of religious belief) that «setting out a requirement that a religious gathering on private premises could not take place without registration or to any domestic law or provisions which could constitute the legal basis for the dispersal of a gathering held in places which were in private ownership» (§ 58). On the contrary, Art. 21 of the 1992 Law on freedom of religious belief specifically provided for the freedom of «services of religious worship, rites and ceremonies at places of worship and adjacent areas, shrines, cemeteries, religious organisations, and citizens’ houses and apartments» (§ 58). Furthermore, the Strasbourg Judges note that Art. 515.0.2 of the CAO applies exclusively to those who have established or are running a religious organisation. Since the applicant was simply a guest participant and not the owner of the dwelling, it is unclear how the administrative offence could have been imputed to him under that article. This inconsistency is aggravated by the fact that the domestic judges failed to provide sufficient reasoning for the conviction, which seems to have been based solely on his presence at the religious meeting (§ 59). Regardless of whether the private residence where the applicant met was considered a place of worship – a hypothesis supported by the Government – the Court feels obliged to reiterate a fundamental principle.

Although States are permitted to require the registration of religious denominations in accordance with Articles 9 and 11 of the Convention, this requirement in no way authorizes sanctioning a single member of an unregistered organisation for exercising their freedom to pray or manifest their religious faith. To assert the contrary would be to exclude minority faiths lacking official registration and, in essence, grant the State the power to impose what a person may or may not believe (§ 60). Based on these considerations, the Court considers it sufficient to conclude that the interference in question was not «prescribed by law» within the meaning of Article 9 § 2 of the Convention and finds a violation of Art. 9 of the Convention (§§ 61-63).

 

(Comment by Laura Restuccia)