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MJ v. AA, Case C-521/21, CJEU (Grand Chamber), 24 March 2026

MJ v. AA, Case C-521/21, CJEU (Grand Chamber), 24 March 2026

The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 24 March 2026 in Case C-521/21, MJ v AA, forms part of the case-law concerning the Rule of Law and, in particular, judicial independence as an essential requirement for ensuring the right to effective judicial protection under Article 19(1), second subparagraph, TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

The case originated in a reference for a preliminary ruling from a Polish court seised of an application for the recusal of a judge in civil proceedings. The applicant alleged that the judge concerned—like a significant number of other judges in the Polish judicial system—had been appointed following a procedure which the Court of Justice had already found to be incompatible with EU law. However, national legislation and domestic case-law precluded any review of the legality of judicial appointments or of the bodies involved in that appointment procedure.

In that context, the referring court asked the Court of Justice whether: (a) national legislation precluding, in recusal proceedings, any examination of the legality of the appointment of the judge concerned is compatible with the right to effective judicial protection under Article 19(1), second subparagraph, TEU and Article 47 of the Charter; and (b) whether, in the circumstances of the case, the judge could be regarded as independent and impartial.

As regards the first question, the Court held that such restrictions are incompatible with EU law in so far as they prevent the assessment of whether the court called upon to rule satisfies the requirements of independence and impartiality. In this regard, the principle of primacy of EU law requires that the national provisions at issue be disapplied to the extent that they prevent such review of the legality of the appointment of the judge concerned.

As regards the second question, the Court held that an irregularity in the judicial appointment procedure is not sufficient, in itself, to conclude that a judge lacks independence. It is necessary to carry out an overall assessment of all relevant circumstances of the appointment process and of the functioning of the judicial body concerned.

In conclusion, the judgment confirms that limitations under national law on reviewing the regularity of the composition of a court cannot prevail over the requirements stemming from the right to effective judicial protection under EU law. It further clarifies that judicial independence cannot be assessed automatically on the basis of a defect in the appointment procedure alone, but requires a concrete and overall assessment of all relevant circumstances, taken as a whole, in order to ensure the effectiveness of judicial protection and the coherence of the EU legal order.

 

(Comment by Pietro Campana)